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INTRODUCTION
Moser et al. (2013) report a novel meta-
analysis across 37 studies demonstrating a
small-to-medium association between the
error-related negativity (ERN) and self-
report measures of anxiety (r = −0.25);
the meta-analysis further indicates a
stronger relationship between the ERN
and anxious apprehension (r = −0.35)
than anxious arousal (r = −0.09). Based
on these results, Moser et al. articu-
late their compensatory error monitoring
hypothesis (CEMH). In brief, the CEMH
proposes that the relationship between
anxious apprehension and an increased
ERN is due to the distracting effects
of worry: worrisome thoughts make it
more difficult for anxious individuals to
maintain task-related goals; as a result,
increased effort must be employed. The
CEMH suggests that an increased ERN
reflects the transient increase in effort to
compensate for the distracting effects of
worry. Though we agree withmany aspects
of the CEMH (e.g., the importance of
apprehensive anxiety; the potential impact
of worry on the ERN), we believe that
motivation and emotion are central con-
structs to understanding both within- and
between-subjects variation in the ERN.
ERRORS ARE AVERSIVE (ESPECIALLY
FOR ANXIOUS PEOPLE)
Threat has traditionally been concep-
tualized in terms of external stimuli—
things with the capacity or intention to
harm an individual. We hypothesized that
the commission of errors might simi-
larly be threatening (Hajcak and Foti,
2008; Hajcak, 2012): making mistakes
place an individual in unknown danger.
In support of this view, errors are expe-
rienced as distressing (Spunt et al., 2012)
and are associated with a host of physio-
logical changes consistent with defensive
mobilization: following errors, the star-
tle reflex is increased (Hajcak and Foti,
2008; Riesel et al., 2013), heart rate decel-
erates (Hajcak et al., 2003, 2004), the pupil
dilates (Critchley et al., 2005), the cor-
rugator (i.e., frowning) muscle contracts
(Lindstrom et al., 2013), and a sympa-
thetic nervous system response is evident
in skin conductance changes (Hajcak et al.,
2003, 2004). Moreover, there is increasing
behavioral evidence that errors and other
variants of response conflict are aversive
(Botvinick, 2007; Dreisbach and Fischer,
2012; Schouppe et al., 2012). Indeed,
errors activate many of the same neural
circuits associated with the experience of
negative affect (Shackman et al., 2011).
Previously we used the term defen-
sive motivation in discussing both state
and trait effects (Hajcak, 2012; Weinberg
et al., 2012b); to avoid potential confu-
sion here, we use the term threat sensitivity
to refer to trait-like individual differences
which we contrast with defensive motiva-
tion, which reflects a transient response
to threat. Thus, we view errors as unpre-
dictable threats that prompt an immediate
defensive motivational response. Further,
we believe that variation in the ERN
reflects a trait difference in early threat sen-
sitivity that drives vigilance and increased
defensive motivational responses. This
view is consonant with theories of early-
emerging and stable individual differ-
ences in temperamental styles such as
behavioral inhibition (Fox et al., 2005) and
related forms of dispositional anxiety (Fox
et al., 2008; Shankman et al., 2013). High
behavioral inhibition describes increased
sensitivity to environmental cues of pun-
ishment, novelty, and threat (Gray and
McNaughton, 2000); dispositional anxiety
refers to a tendency to respond excessively
in the face of potential or uncertain threats
(Barlow, 2002; Grupe and Nitschke, 2013;
see also Hirsh and Inzlicht, 2008).
In this context, we argue that the
increased ERN characteristic of anxious
individuals reflects the disposition to
respond more strongly to uncertain threat
(Hajcak, 2012; Weinberg et al., 2012b).
Moser et al. suggest that there is no evi-
dence that anxious individuals are charac-
terized by a greater defensive response to
errors. However, in one study, participants
scoring high in trait negative emotional-
ity demonstrated larger increases in skin
conductance after making errors (Hajcak
et al., 2004). Moreover, anxious people
report excessive concern about their mis-
takes. We would similarly predict larger
startle responses after errors among more
anxious individuals, and would encourage
additional studies in which variability in
the ERN is examined in relation to other
indices of threat sensitivity and defensive
motivation.
THE ERN AS ENDOPHENOTYPE
We (Olvet and Hajcak, 2008) and oth-
ers more recently (Manoach and Agam,
2013) have argued that there is con-
siderable evidence that the ERN is a
candidate psychiatric endophenotype. An
endophenotype must be associated with
an illness, heritable, evident in unaffected
first-degree family members, and indepen-
dent of current disease state (Gottesman
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and Gould, 2003; Miller and Rockstroh,
2013). Moser et al. dismiss this possibility,
citing only one study in which treatment-
related reductions in OCD symptoms
did not reduce the ERN in a pediatric
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD)
sample (Hajcak et al., 2008). However,
there is considerable evidence that the
ERN is stable over time and behaves like
an endophenotype. For instance, the ERN
demonstrates sufficient test-retest reliabil-
ity over two weeks to more than two years
(Olvet and Hajcak, 2009; Weinberg and
Hajcak, 2011).Moreover, about 50% of the
variation in ERN amplitude appears to be
heritable (Anokhin et al., 2008), and varia-
tion in the ERNhas been linked to a variety
of genes (Manoach and Agam, 2013). Two
recent studies found an increased ERN in
unaffected first-degree relatives of OCD
patients (Riesel et al., 2011; Carrasco et al.,
2013). These data point toward the ERN as
a neural endophenotype.
DISTINGUISHING REACTIVITY TO
THREAT FROM SUBSEQUENT
COMPENSATORY PROCESSES
A fundamental distinction between our
view and the CEMH is that we do not
view the relationship between ERN and
anxiety as compensatory. We make a
strong distinction between temporally ear-
lier defensive motivational responses that
vary with threat sensitivity and later com-
pensatory responses that include cogni-
tive processes such as worry (Borkovec
et al., 2004; Newman and Llera, 2011;
Mennin and Fresco, 2013). We believe that
increased threat sensitivity (i.e., behavioral
inhibition) precedes the development of
compensatory processes such as worry—
both phylogenetically and ontogeneti-
cally. That is, heightened trait differences
in threat sensitivity can lead to vari-
ous forms of cognitive compensation—
including worry. As such, we would argue
that worriers actually have two problems:
they are more sensitive to uncertain threat,
and they have developed maladaptive cog-
nitive coping strategies to deal with their
increased threat sensitivity (e.g., worry).
Within this framework, we believe that
the ERN relates to trait-like vulnerabili-
ties in threat sensitivity rather than com-
pensatory efforts to modulate increased
threat sensitivity such as worry. This dis-
tinction is especially relevant in terms
of prospective and developmental predic-
tions. For instance, a formal worry process
may not be clearly evident in young chil-
dren (Vasey et al., 1994). However, we
found increased ERNs in clinically anx-
ious 6 year-olds, who were mainly phobic
(Meyer et al., 2013). This would suggest
that increased ERN, reflecting heightened
threat sensitivity, develops before processes
like worry. Our model presumes that an
increased ERN would prospectively pre-
dict increases in anxiety and worry—and
that an increased ERN would be a risk
marker for the development and onset of
anxiety disorders. Our model would also
predict an increased ERN among more
anxious non-human animals that are pre-
sumably less prone to verbally-mediated
compensatory processes such as worry;
for instance, the ERN can be measured
in non-human primates (Godlove et al.,
2011) who show marked differences in
behavioral inhibition and anxiety (Fox
et al., 2008).
THE ERN IS SENSITIVE TO STATE
AFFECT
Many trait-like measures and phenotypes
(e.g., anhedonia) can be altered and
manipulated in the short-term (e.g., via
stressors and mood inductions; also see
Coan et al., 2006). Moser et al. argue
that changes in state affect do not con-
sistently modulate the ERN. However, it
might be important to distinguish between
affect that is integrally related to errors and
affect that is incidental (see Schmeichel
and Inzlicht, 2013). When spider pho-
bics make errors on a flanker task in the
presence of a spider, their fear is inci-
dental to error processing (Moser et al.,
2005). However, if their fear was related
to making an error (e.g., if spider pho-
bics had to view pictures of spiders after
making mistakes), then their fear would
be integrally related to errors. Emerging
data suggests that variation in motiva-
tion to make errors does impact the ERN.
When integral negative affect is added,
such as when errors are punished (Riesel
et al., 2012), when performance is eval-
uated (Hajcak et al., 2005), when errors
are more valuable (Hajcak et al., 2005)
or personally meaningful (Amodio et al.,
2008; Legault and Inzlicht, 2013), the ERN
tends to increase; when integral negative
affect is subtracted, such as when people
are led to misattribute their affect to an
external and benign source (Inzlicht and
Al-Khindi, 2012) or when they ingest an
anxiolytic agent that leads them to care less
about their errors (Bartholow et al., 2012),
the ERN decreases. In our model, worry-
ing might potentiate the ERN if it were to
increase the threat value of errors. It will
be important for future studies to deter-
mine the extent to which state variabil-
ity in worry accounts for the relationship
between trait anxiety and the ERN.
FUTURE CHALLENGES
Moser et al.’s paper encourage greater phe-
notypic specificity for understanding the
increased ERN in relation to anxiety—
and this is a significant contribution (see
also Vaidyanathan et al., 2012). Worry
is one phenotype that may account for
the increased ERN in anxiety disorders;
however, we would also encourage con-
tinued efforts to evaluate the ERN in
relation to additional, empirically-derived
phenotypes (Watson et al., 2007). Indeed,
some extant clinical data already sug-
gests that the relationship between anxi-
ety and the ERN may require examining
the interaction between key phenotypes.
For instance, comorbid major depressive
disorder (MDD)—which is also charac-
terized by increased worry—appears to
mask the relationship between GAD and
an increased ERN; history of MDD, how-
ever, does not seem to impact the increased
ERN in GAD (Weinberg et al., 2012a). We
have suggested that state-related character-
istics of depression (i.e., anhedonia) may
alter the relationship between ERN and
trait anxiety.
Moser et al. also sound a call for more
specific predictions and assertions regard-
ing the relationship between ERN and
anxiety. We agree, and our view focuses
on possible causes and subsequent devel-
opment of anxiety disorders (i.e., models
of etiopathogenesis). One possibility from
the endophenotype perspective is that the
same genes that confer risk for the devel-
opment of anxiety disorders determine
variability in the ERN. Another possibility
is that environmental (i.e., non-genetic)
factors that impact error saliencemodulate
the ERN. In an approach rooted in models
of fear conditioning and extinction-based
learning, we inflated the threat value of
errors by punishing certain mistakes; even
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after mistakes were no longer punished,
the ERN was potentiated on trials that
had formerly been punished (Riesel et al.,
2012). Based on these data, we suggested
that early learning experiences (e.g., crit-
ical parenting) may lead to a larger ERN.
Our view is consonant with the possibility
that ERN neurodevelopment is impacted
by both genetic and environmental factors
that shape characteristic defensive motiva-
tional responses to errors. There are multi-
ple pathways to increased threat sensitivity.
Our conceptualization gets at a funda-
mental issue: why are some people more
worried to begin with? Our view is that
an elevated ERN reflects a broad disposi-
tion toward increased sensitivity to uncer-
tain threat, and that some individuals
attempt to compensate for this via worry
(Mennin and Fresco, 2013). The most sig-
nificant advantages of the endophenotype
approach are the potential for identifying
genetic contributions to disorders (e.g.,
the genetics of the ERN are simpler than
the genetics of complex disorder-based
phenotypes), for identifying those at risk
for disorders, and for bridging human and
animal models. Future steps would then
include more mechanistic studies to clarify
causation and identify novel interventions.
Accordingly, we suggest further research
to understand the conditions under which
variability in the ERN leads to patholog-
ical outcomes. Could manipulating the
ERN causally alter risk for anxiety and
compensatory efforts like worry? As a pro-
posed metaphor, we consider the rela-
tionship between cholesterol and coronary
heart disease (CHD): high levels of low
density lipoproteins (LDL) is a partially
inherited risk factor for CHD; risk for
CHD is lowered by directly manipulat-
ing LDL through medication and lifestyle
change. LDL levels are trait-like, genet-
ically determined, and yet, are sensitive
to state-related (i.e., diet) manipulations;
lowering LDL alters subsequent risk for
disease. In this way, the ERN itself might be
a unique target for intervention and pre-
vention efforts. Our view focuses on lever-
aging variability in the ERN to understand
the development of, and risk for, psycho-
logical disorders. This approach requires
large and longitudinal studies to delin-
eate trajectories of risk, and to parse the
prospective relationship between ERN and
increases in anxiety.
CONCLUSION
Although there is much to like about the
CEMH, we believe that it does not fully
address the critical contribution of emo-
tion to the ERN. Importantly, when exam-
ining the influence of anxiety on the ERN,
it is vital to account for trait-level dif-
ferences in emotionality; to distinguish
between threat sensitivity and compen-
satory efforts to deal with threat such as
worry, and to differentiate between inte-
gral and incidental affect. Emotion is both
a core aspect of anxiety and why errors
powerfully shape behavior. Emotion is at
the heart of the anxiety-ERN relationship.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Special thanks to Jason Moser, Alexander
Shackman and Anna Weinberg for their
comments on earlier versions of this paper.
REFERENCES
Amodio, D. M., Devine, P. G., and Harmon-Jones, E.
(2008). Individual differences in the regulation of
intergroup bias: the role of conflict monitoring and
neural signals for control. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 94,
60–74. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.1.60
Anokhin, A. P., Golosheykin, S., and Heath, A.
C. (2008). Heritability of frontal brain function
related to action monitoring. Psychophysiology 45,
524–534. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2008.00664.x
Barlow, D. H. (2002).Anxiety and its Disorders (Second
Edition). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Bartholow, B. D., Henry, E. A., Lust, S. A., Saults,
J. S., and Wood, P. K. (2012). Alcohol effects on
performance monitoring and adjustment: affect
modulation and impairment of evaluative cogni-
tive control. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 121, 173–186. doi:
10.1037/a0023664
Borkovec, T. D., Alcaine, O., and Behar, E. (2004).
“Avoidance theory of worry and generalized anx-
iety disorder,” in Generalized Anxiety Disorder:
Advances in Research and Practice, eds R. G.
Heimberg, C. L. Turk, and D. S. Mennin (New
York, NY: Guilford Press), 77–108.
Botvinick, M. M. (2007). Conflict monitoring and
decision making: reconciling two perspectives on
anterior cingulate function. Cogn. Affect. Behav.
Neurosci. 7, 356–366. doi: 10.3758/CABN.7.4.356
Carrasco, M., Harbin, S. M., Nieuhuis, J. K.,
Fitzgerald, K. D., Gehring, W. J., and Hanna, G.
L. (2013). Increased error-related brain activity
in youth with obsessive-compulsive disorder and
unaffected siblings. Depress. Anxiety 30, 39–46.
doi: 10.1002/da.22035
Coan, J. A., Allen, J. J. B., and McKnight, P. E. (2006).
A capability model of individual differences in
frontal EEG activity. Biol. Psychol. 72, 198–207. doi:
10.1016/j.biopsycho.2005.10.003
Critchley, H. D., Tang, J., Glaser, D., Butterworth,
B., and Dolan, R. J. (2005). Anterior cin-
gulate activity during error and autonomic
response. Neuroimage 27, 885–895. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2005.05.047
Dreisbach, G., and Fischer, R. (2012). Conflicts
as aversive signals. Brain Cogn. 78, 94–98. doi:
10.1016/j.bandc.2011.12.003
Fox, A. S., Shelton, S. E., Oakes, T. R., Davidson, R.
J., and Kalin, N. H. (2008). Trait-like brain activity
during adolescence predicts anxious temperament
in primates. PLoS ONE 3:e2570. doi: 10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0002570
Fox, N. A., Henderson, H. A., Marshall, P. J., Nichols,
K. E., and Ghera, M. M. (2005). Behavioral inhi-
bition: linking biology and behavior within a
developmental framework. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 56,
235–262. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.
141532
Godlove, D. C., Emeric, E. E., Segovis, C. M.,
Young, M. S., Schall, J. D., and Woodman, G.
F. (2011). Event-related potentials elicited by
errors during the stop-signal task. I. Macaque
Monkeys. J. Neurosci. 31, 15640–15649. doi: 10.
1523/JNEUROSCI.3349-11.2011
Gottesman, I. I., and Gould, T. D. (2003). The
endophenotype concept in psychiatry: etymology
and strategic intentions. Am. J. Psychiatry 160,
636–645. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.160.4.636
Gray, J. A., and McNaughton, N. (2000). The
Neuropsychology of Anxiety: An Enquiry into the
Functions of the Septo-hippocampal System, 2nd
Edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grupe, D. W., and Nitschke, J. B. (2013). Uncertainty
and anticipation in anxiety: an integrated neuro-
biological and psychological perspective. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 14, 488–501. doi: 10.1038/nrn3524
Hajcak, G. (2012). What we’ve learned from our
mistakes: insights from error-related brain activ-
ity. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 21, 101–106. doi:
10.1177/0963721412436809
Hajcak, G., and Foti, D. (2008). Errors are aversive:
defensive motivation and the error-related neg-
ativity. Psychol. Sci. 19, 103–108. doi: 10.1111/j.
1467-9280.2008.02053.x
Hajcak, G., Franklin, M. E., Foa, E. B., and Simons,
R. F. (2008). Increased error-related brain activ-
ity in pediatric OCD before and after treat-
ment. Am. J. Psychiatry 165, 116–123. doi:
10.1176/appi.ajp.2007.07010143
Hajcak, G., McDonald, N., and Simons, R. F.
(2003). To err is autonomic: error-related brain
potentials, ANS activity, and post-error compen-
satory behavior. Psychophysiology 40, 895–903. doi:
10.1111/1469-8986.00107
Hajcak, G., McDonald, N., and Simons, R. F.
(2004). Error-related psychophysiology and
negative affect. Brain Cogn. 56, 189–197. doi:
10.1016/j.bandc.2003.11.001
Hajcak, G., Moser, J. S., Yeung, N., and Simons, R. F.
(2005). On the ERN and the significance of errors.
Psychophysiology 42, 151–160. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2005.00270.x
Hirsh, J. B., and Inzlicht, M. (2008). The devil
you know: neuroticism predicts neural response
to uncertainty. Psychol. Sci. 19, 962–967. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02183.x
Inzlicht, M., and Al-Khindi, T. (2012). ERN and the
placebo: a misattribution approach to studying
the arousal properties of the error-related neg-
ativity. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 141, 799–807. doi:
10.1037/a0027586
Legault, L., and Inzlicht, M. (2013). Self-
determination, self-regulation, and the brain:
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 636 | 3
Proudfit et al. Error monitoring and anxiety
autonomy improves performance by enhancing
neuroaffective responsiveness to self-regulation
failure. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 105, 123–138. doi:
10.1037/a0030426
Lindstrom, B. R., Mattsson-Marn, I. B., Golkar, A.,
and Olsson, A. (2013). In your face: risk of punish-
ment enhances cognitive control and error-related
activity in the corrugator supercilii muscle. PLoS
ONE 8:e65692. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0065692
Manoach, D. S., and Agam, Y. (2013). Neural mark-
ers of errors as endophenotypes in neuropsychi-
atric disease. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:350. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00350
Mennin, D. S., and Fresco, D. M. (2013). What,
me worry and ruminate about DSM-V and
RDoC?: the importance of targeting negative self-
referential processing. Clin. Psychol. Sci. Pract. 20,
258–267.
Meyer, A., Hajcak, G., Torpey, D. C., Kujawa, A., Kim,
J., Bufferd, S., et al. (2013). Increased error-related
brain activity in six-year-old children with clini-
cal anxiety. J. Abnorm. Child Psychol. doi: 10.1007/
s10802-013-9762-8. [Epub ahead of print].
Miller, G. A., and Rockstroh, B. (2013).
Endophenotypes in psychopathology research:
where do we stand? Annu. Rev. Clin. Psychol. 9,
177–213. doi: 10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-050212-
185540
Moser, J. S., Hajcak, G., and Simons, R. F. (2005).
The effects of fear on performance monitoring
and attentional allocation. Psychophysiology 42,
261–268. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2005.00290.x
Moser, J. S., Moran, T. P., Schroder, H. S., Donnellan,
M. B., and Yeung, N. (2013). On the relationship
between anxiety and error monitoring: a meta-
analysis and conceptual framework. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 7:466. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00466
Newman, M. G., and Llera, S. (2011). A novel
theory of experiential avoidance in generalized
anxiety disorder: a review and synthesis of
research supporting a contrast avoidance model
of worry. Clin. Psychol. Rev. 31, 371–382. doi:
10.1016/j.cpr.2011.01.008
Olvet, D. M., and Hajcak, G. (2008). The error-related
negativity (ERN) and psychopathology: toward an
endophenotype. Clin. Psychol. Rev. 28, 1343–1354.
doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2008.07.003
Olvet, D. M., and Hajcak, G. (2009). Reliability of
error-related brain activity. Brain Res. 1284, 89–99.
doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2009.05.079
Riesel, A., Endrass, T., Kaufmann, C., and Kathmann,
N. (2011). Overactive error-related brain
activity as a candidate endophenotype for
obsessive–compulsive disorder: evidence from
unaffected first-degree relatives. Am. J. Psychiatry
168, 317–324. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2010.100
30416
Riesel, A., Weinberg, A., Endrass, T. Kathmann,
N., and Hajcak, G. (2012). Punishment has a
lasting impact on error-related brain activity.
Psychophysiology 49, 239–247. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2011.01298.x
Riesel, A., Weinberg, A., Moran, T., and Hajcak, G.
(2013). Time course of error-potentiated startle
and its relationship to error-related brain activ-
ity. J. Psychophysiol. 27, 51–59. doi: 10.1027/0269-
8803/a000093
Schmeichel, B. J., and Inzlicht, M. (2013). “Incidental
and integral effects of emotions on self-control,”
in Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, eds M. D.
Robinson, E. R. Watkins, and E. Harmon-Jones
(New York, NY: Guilford Press), 272–290.
Schouppe, N., De Houwer, J., Ridderinkhof, K.
R., and Notebaert, W. (2012). Conflict: run!
reduced stroop interference with avoidance
responses. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 65, 1052–1058. doi:
10.1080/17470218.2012.685080
Shackman, A. J., Salomons, T. V., Slagter, H. A., Fox,
A. S., Winter, J. J., and Davidson, R. J. (2011). The
integration of negative affect, pain and cognitive
control in the cingulate cortex. Nat. Rev. Neurosci.
12, 154–167. doi: 10.1038/nrn2994
Shankman, A. J., Fox, A. S., Oler, J. A., Shelton,
S. E., Davidson, R. J., and Kalin, N. H. (2013).
Neural mechanisms underlying heterogeneity in
the presentation of anxious temperament. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 110, 6145–6150. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1214364110
Spunt, R. P., Lieberman, M. D., Cohen, J. R., and
Eisenberger, N. I. (2012). The phenomenology
of error-processing: the dorsal ACC response to
stop-signal errors tracks reports of negative affect.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 24, 1753–1765. doi: 10.1162/
jocn_a_00242
Vaidyanathan, U., Nelson, L. D., and Patrick, C.
J. (2012). Clarifying domains of internalizing
psychopathology using neurophysiology. Psychol.
Med. 42, 447–459. doi: 10.1017/S0033291711
001528
Vasey, M. W., Crnic, K. A., and Carter, W. G.
(1994). Worry in childhood: a developmental
perspective. Cogn. Ther. Res. 18, 529–549. doi:
10.1007/BF02355667
Watson, D., O’Hara, M. W., Simms, L. J., Kotov, R.,
Chmielewski, M., McDade-Montez, E. A., et al.
(2007). Development and validation of the inven-
tory of depression and anxiety symptoms (IDAS).
Psychol. Assess. 19, 253–268.
Weinberg, A., and Hajcak, G. (2011). Longer-
term test-retest reliability of error-related brain
activity. Psychophysiology 48, 1420–1425. doi:
10.1111/j.1469-8986.2011.01206.x
Weinberg, A., Klein, D. N., and Hajcak, G. (2012a).
Increased error-related brain activity distinguishes
generalized anxiety disorder with and without
comorbid major depressive disorder. J. Abnorm.
Psychol. 121, 885–896. doi: 10.1037/a0028270
Weinberg, A., Riesel, A., and Hajcak, G. (2012b).
Integrating multiple perspectives on error-related
brain activity: the ERN as a neural indicator of
trait defensive reactivity. Motiv. Emot. 36, 84–100.
doi: 10.1007/s11031-011-9269-y
Received: 12 September 2013; accepted: 12 September
2013; published online: 08 October 2013.
Citation: Proudfit GH, InzlichtM and Mennin DS
(2013) Anxiety and error monitoring: the importance of
motivation and emotion. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:636.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00636
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2013 Proudfit, Inzlicht and Mennin.
This is an open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
(CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other
forums is permitted, provided the original author(s)
or licensor are credited and that the original pub-
lication in this journal is cited, in accordance with
accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with
these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 636 | 4
